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NLRB ASSERTS JURISDICTION OVER LAW FIRMS: HAS
THE DOOR BEEN OPENED TO LAWYER UNIONIZATION?
In 1958, white collar workers accounted for just twelve percent
of total union membership; by 1977 that figure had doubled.' A re-
cent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision to assert ju-
risdiction over law firms reflects-and may accelerate-this trend.2
Although the decision directly involved only the firm's clerical em-
ployees, it potentially affects lawyers as well. Attempts by attorneys
to unionize date back to 1948, when the lawyers employed by an in-
surance company gained NLRB recognition as a bargaining unit.3
More recently, the lawyers of two legal services corporations have
formed unions.4 If the experience of some other professions provides
a guide, substantial numbers of attorneys may wish to join unions. In
examining lawyer unionization, this Comment will describe the proc-
ess by which the NLRB came to assert jurisdiction over law firms, and
consider the legal and ethical problems inherent in the development
of lawyers' unions.
I. NLRB DECISIONS INVOLVING LAW FIRMS
The National Labor Relations Act 5 (the Act) grants the Board
power to assert jurisdiction over labor disputes. Although this power
is coterminous with Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, 6
in order to keep its caseload manageable the Board has chosen to limit
its jurisdiction to disputes having a substantial impact on interstate
commerce." A 1959 amendment to the Act authorized the Board to
decline jurisdiction over labor disputes involving any class of employ-
ers that, in the Board's opinion, has an insubstantial effect on com-
1. Kistler, Trends in Union Growth, 28 LAB. L.J. 539, 542 (1977).
2. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,067 (1977).
3. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).
4. Camden Regional Legal Servs., 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,615 (1977); Wayne
County Neighborhood Legal Servs., 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,262 (1977).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
6. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (The grant
of authority to the Board contemplates NLRB jurisdiction over commerce as defined in
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution.).
7. From its inception the Board declined jurisdiction over cases it deemed essen-
tially local in character. See, e.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
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merce.8 Thus, the Board possesses discretionary authority to decline
jurisdiction over law firms as a class, as it has done with other em-
ployers.9 The first representation case in which the employer was a
law firm was Evans & Kunz Ltd.'0 The firm argued that the Board
should decline jurisdiction over law firms generally, and in the alter-
native, that it should decline jurisdiction over Evans k Kunz because
the firm consisted of only four to six attorneys who practiced mostly
within Arizona." A majority of -the Board suggested that it would not
effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over law firms
in any case, but found it unnecessary to reach this broader question
to settle the controversy before it. The Board declined jurisdiction,
but limited its decision "solely to the facts of the instant case, and not
to law firms as a class.' 12
This indefinite state of law was short-lived. One year later, in
Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild,"3 the Board reevalu-
ated the arguments in Evans, and this time declined jurisdiction over
law firms as a class.'4 The rationale of the decision was that law prac-
tice is not commerce, and 'therefore law firms cannot substantially af-
fect interstate commerce. To reach this result, the Board dichotomized
legal and commercial activity. It reasoned that a law firm does not en-
gage in "the production, distribution, or sale of goods in commerce
... . [Its] connection with the flow of commerce is incidental, and
its primary services relate to law, not . . . commercial activity."' I Ac-
8. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1970). This amendment overruled Supreme Court
decisions holding that while the Board could decline jurisdiction over particular dis-
putes it exceeded its authority when it excluded whole categories of employers from cov-
erage under the Act, as in Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958),
and Office Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
9. For example, in Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 698 (1971), and
Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 20 (1950), the Board declined jurisdiction
over the horseracing industry as a class. Similarly in Seattle Real Estate Bd., 130
N.L.R.B. 608 (1961), it declined jurisdiction over realtors.
10. 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972).
11. The firm's gross volume of business was $300,000. Id. Thus it would exceed
the present NLRB threshold-$250,000-for jurisdiction over law firms. See note 23
inf ra.
12. 194 N.L.R.B. at 1216 (footnote omitted).
13. 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973).
14. Id. at 514.
15. Id. at 513. Bodle also cited as secondary concerns the difficulty of establishing
a jurisdictional yardstick, and the danger to lawyer-client confidentiality. The opinion
was criticized for its concern with problems that were not insurmountable. Note, 7
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 385 (1974); Note, 41 TENN. L. Rrv. 745 (1974). Subsequently in
Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,067 (1977), the Board resolved both of
these problems. It noted that a minimum dollar amount of gross annual revenues has
been established as the jurisdictional criterion for all other fields, and stated that one
would be established for law firms as well. Id. at 30,069. As for confidentiality, the
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cording to Bodle, it is the clients of lawyers who engage in commerce,
not -the lawyers themselves. The dissenting opinion pointed out that
American business could not function without the legal profession to
help it incorporate, procure licenses, obtain governmental approval of
rates, and issue stocks and bonds.:6 The dissenters felt that no mean-
ingful distinction could be drawn between such services and "com-
mercial activity."
Although Bodle temporarily foreclosed the possibility of union-
ization by law firm employees, 17 its underlying rationale was soon un-
dercut by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.18 The
plaintiffs in Goldfarb alleged that the Virginia State Bar Association
had violated the antitrust law by setting minimum prices for various
legal services.19 As a prerequisite to deciding whether there was an
antitrust violation, the Court first had to decide whether law firms
engage in interstate commerce. The Court found that examining a
land title, the legal service sought by the plaintiffs, is "commerce"
when performed for a fee.20 The Court also reasoned that this service
affects "commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. It noted
that a title search is a prerequisite to obtaining financing, and that,
especially where an FHA or VA mortgage is involved, such financing
often involves interstate transactions.21 Thus the Court in Goldfarb
affirmed what the dissenters on the Bodle Board had said-that legal
services are an integral part of American commercial activity.
Goldfarb gave law firm employees grounds for asking the Board
to reconsider Bodle. In Foley, Hoag & Eliot,22 the Board reviewed a
denial of the United File Room Clerks & Messengers' petition to rep-
resent the clerical employees of the Boston law firm of Foley, Hoag, &
Eliot. Citing Goldfarb, the Board found that law firms do engage in
opinion noted that peculiar situations may arise, as in Bodle where one of the law
firm's clients was a labor union rivaling the one seeking to represent the firm's em-
ployees. However, the Board noted that these problems could be handled on a case by
case basis. Id. at 30,069 n.12.
16. 206 N.L.R.B. at 515 (Members Fanning & Penello, dissenting).
17. Technically, lawyers still have a first amendment right to organize, but with-
out NLRB recognition they lose the protections of the Act, such as the employer's duty
to bargain in good faith and to allow employees to engage in concerted activities, in-
cluding strikes, without reprimand. Note, Organizational Rights of Managerial Em-
ployees, 53 N.C.L. REv. 809 (1975).
18. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Foley, the Board said that Member Jenkins, the only
remaining majority member from the Bodle case, suggested this interpretation of Gold-
farb. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,067, 30,068 (1977).
19. 421 U.S. at 778.
20. Id. at 787-88.
21. Id. at 784.
22. 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,067 (1977).
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interstate commerce, and that the purposes of the Act would be effec-
tuated by the assertion of jurisdiction over law firms as a class, thereby
overruling Bodle.23 To justify its reliance on Goldfarb, an antitrust
case, the Board noted that Congress intended to regulate labor rela-
tions as extensively as it did monopolies, 24 and reasoned therefore that
Goldfarb's finding that lawyers engage in interstate commerce should
apply to labor relations as well as to antitrust law.
Foley potentially affects two groups of workers: clerical employees
of law firms, and staff attorneys. Its impact on the first group is direct.
Where an appropriate jurisdictional prerequisite is met,25 clerical em-
ployees will be entitled to exercise the rights enumerated in section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act,20 including the rights to organize
for mutual aid and protection and to engage in collective bargaining.
The importance of Foley for lawyers, however, is not as clear. To
benefit from it, lawyers' unions would have to show that lawyers are
"employees" 27 and that their firms are "employers" 28 as defined in the
Act. While the term "employees" does include "professionals," 2 it
23. Id. at 30,068. The opinion also noted that a jurisdictional prerequisite would
later bet set. This standard was enunciated in Camden Regional Legal Servs., Inc.,
1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,615 (1977), in which the Board declared that law firms gross-
ing $250,000 or more annually will be subject to NLRB jurisdiction.
24. 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,067 (1977) (citing Van Camp Sea Food Co., 212
N.L.R.B. 537 (1974) ).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
27. The Act's definition of "employee," in pertinent part, is as follows: "The
term 'employee' shall include any employee, . . . but shall not include .. . any indi-
vidual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by.. . any other person who is not an employer
as herein defined." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
28. The relevant portion of the Act defining "employer" states: "The term 'em-
ployer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or
any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1970).
29. The Act defines "professional employee" in this language:
The term "professional employee" means-
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and
varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judg-
ment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or
the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of
time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as dis-
tinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or
from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes;
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
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excludes anyone with "supervisory" 30 or "managerial" 31 powers. Analy-
sis of the evolution of these terms will reveal that the distinctions be-
tween them are not always clear, creating uncertainty as to whether
attorneys will ultimately be allowed -to organize under the Act.
II. SOME DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS POSED BY THE ACT
The original Wagner Act did not provide any exclusion for
managerial or supervisory employees. 32 As early as 1944, however, the
Board recognized that those employees who share close ties with man-
agement might have some conflict of interest between their employer
and -the union. In Vulcan Corporation,33 the employer wanted all em-
ployees to be included in the bargaining unit, but the union wanted
to exclude some employees whom it felt were more loyal to manage-
ment. The Board held that one employee who spent seventy-five per-
cent of his time away from the plant buying timber, and who was
accompanied on his trips by a timber superintendent, should not be
included in -the bargaining unit because of "his peculiar relationship
to management, and in view of the fact that his interests are appar-
ently different from those of the production and maintenance em-
ployees. ' 34 In subsequent cases, the Board continued to exclude those
whom it considered to be supervisory or managerial. 35
The exclusion of supervisory employees was interrupted by Pack-
ard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,36 in which the Supreme Court affirmed
a Board decision to assert jurisdiction over a group of foremen. These
individuals had organized as a unit of the Foreman's Association of
America, which represented exclusively supervisory employees. Pack-
ard's foremen were responsible for maintenance of the quantity and
quality of production; they had authority to penalize rank and file
employees for violations of discipline, and to initiate recommenda-
tions for promotion, demotion, and discipline. 37 The employer argued
that its foremen were not employees within the meaning of the Act.
30. "The term 'employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as
a supervisor .... " 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
31. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
32. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970)).
33. 58 N.L.R.B. 733 (1944).
34. Id. at 736.
35. See Note, Will the Real Managerial Employees Please Stand Up? 9 Lov.
L.A.L. REv. 92, 95-97 (1975), and cases cited therein.
36. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
37. Id. at 487.
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At -that time there was no statutory exclusion of supervisors, but the
employer reasoned that section 2 (2) of the Act, defining "employer"
as "any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indi-
rectly," should also include foremen.3s The Court disagreed with this
interpretation, however, noting that, by virtue of their employment,
all employees act in the employer's interests. Instead, the Court em-
phasized that the term "employees" includes "any employee,"' 0 and
that the foremen's interests in pay and working conditions may be ad-
verse to the employer's interests.40 Therefore, the Court held that fore-
men should not be denied the right to bargain collectively to protect
collective interests.
Congress responded to Packard by including in the Taft-Hartley
Act a specific exclusion for "supervisors. ' 41 The exclusion failed to
mention "managers," those who formulate the company's policy but
exercise no direct control over employees. In Swift & Co.,42 decided
in 1956, the Board cleared up this possible confusion by deciding that
"[i]t was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the coverage of
the Act all individuals allied with management .... [R]epresentatives
of management may not be accorded bargaining rights under the
Act."43
The status of managerial employees was thus clear, but the ques-
tion of which employees are managerial was not. No precise defini-
tion has since emerged. In 1970, the Board acknowledged this con-
fused state of affairs in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.,44
and outlined its reasons for excluding managerial employees:
[Ojur concern has been whether certain non-supervisory employees
have a sufficient community of interest with the general group or
class of employees constituting the bulk of a unit so that they may
38. Id. at 488 (quoting National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat.
450 (1935) ) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)).
39. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1935)).
40. Id. at 488-90.
41. "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, . . . but shall not include
. . . any individual employed as a supervisor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). Supervisor
is defined in the Act as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or disci-
pline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
42. 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956).
43. Id. at 753-54 (footnote omitted).
44. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
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appropriately be considered a part thereof. Where the interests of
certain employees seemed to lie more with those persons who formu-
late, determine, and oversee company policy than with those in the
proposed unit who merely carry out the resultant policy, we have
held them to be excluded, and have commonly referred to such ex-
cluded persons as "managerial employees," without ever having at-
tempted a precise definition of that term.45
The opinion went on to suggest that the "community of interest" test
was not satisfactory because an employee might have no community
of interest with a proposed bargaining unit and still be entitled to
protections of the Act. It suggested that the decision to exclude an
employee should focus on whether the employee has any authority to
speak for the employer in the context of labor relations. The Board
found nothing in the record to suggest that the employee in question
participated in the "formulation, determination, or effectuation of
policy with respect to employee relations matters."' 46 It held that since
there was no conflict of interest between the proper performance of
the employee's job and the implementation of his right to engage in
concerted activity, he would not be excluded from the Act. This deci-
sion to exclude managerial employees only when their job duties re-
quired them 'to participate in labor policy greatly clarified the defini-
tion of "manager."
Unfortunately, the Board's efforts were soon thwarted in NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace,47 a 5-4 decision in which the Supreme Court held
that the Board's limitation of the managerial-employees exception to
only those employees with authority to formulate labor policy was too
narrow. The majority viewed the Taft-Hartley amendment excluding
supervisors as evidence of Congress' intent to exclude all persons allied
with management,48 and concluded that a group of employees who
had discretion to commit the employer's credit and to select the com-
pany's suppliers might be sufficiently allied to warrant exclusion. The
Court remanded to the Board to determine whether the purchasing
employees were managerial. On remand, the Board held that the defi-
nition of managerial included "those who formulate and effectuate
management policies by expressing and making operative the deci-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 550-51.
47. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
48. The dissent argued that the legislative history called for the opposite result.
See 416 U.S. at 295-311 (dissenting opinion). See also Note, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 118,




sions of their employer, and those who have discretion in the per-
formance of their jobs independent of their employer's established
policy. '49 Using this -test, the Board found that the purchasing em-
ployees were not managerial because their discretion in buying and
obtaining credit was subject to strict guidelines of the employer.
The Board's definition of "managerial employees" closely re-
sembles the Act's definition of "professional employees," who are spe-
cifically covered by the Act. A "professional employee" includes "any
employee engaged in work ... involving the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment in its performance."50 Similarly, managerial
employees are those who have "discretion in the performance of their
jobs independent of their employer's policy.'' 51 The distinction would
appear to be that discretion "independent" of the employer's policy
makes one managerial, while "mere" discretion renders one profes-
sional.
There are no Board or Court decisions applying the "managerial"
exclusion to lawyers. A note in Bell states that " 'professional employ-
ees' . . . are plainly not the same as 'managerial employees.' . .. [T]he
term 'professional employees' refers to 'such persons as legal, engineer-
ing, scientific and medical personnel together with their junior pro-
fessional assistants.' "52 This optimistic note suggests that lawyers are
professional, not managerial, and that in any case the distinction be-
tween the two groups is clear. Several commentators, however, suggest
that the distinction is not at all obvious.53 Future case law may pro-
vide guidelines concerning the types of discretion that would make
lawyers "managers" within the meaning of the Act. Such discretion
might include the attorneys' authority to make settlements on their
own, 54 or to participate in policy decisions such as whether to adver-
tise, what fees to charge, or what cases or clients the firm should take
on.,
The statutory exclusion of "supervisors" from the protections of
49. Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975) (citing General Dynamics
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974) ).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970).
51. Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (citing General Dynamics Corp., 213
N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974) ) (emphasis added).
52. 416 U.S. at 285 n.13 (quoting H.R. Cong. Report No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 36, reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 1135, 1141).
53. See Note, supra note 48, at 118; Note, supra note 35; Note, Organizational
Rights of Managerial Employees, 53 N.C.L. REv. 809 (1975).
54. In Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948), the Board
found some insurance company lawyers to be protected by the Act, relying in part on
their lack of authority to make out-of-court settlements.
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the. Act may also hinder lawyer unionization.55 (Recall that "super-
Visors" directly regulate other employees, whereas managers formulate
company policy but have no direct control over employees.)56 As
unionization has become more common among white collar workers,
the Board has been forced to consider -the application of the super-
visory exclusion to such professionals as pharmacists, 5t engineers,58 and
university professors. 59 In these cases, the Board must decide whether
the employee's authority is no more than an inherent aspect of pro-
fessional status, or is supervisory authority within the meaning of the
Act.60 For example, registered nurses direct the work of lesser-trained
employees in the care of patients, yet they have been held to be cov-
ered by the Act.6' Where the nurses' authority can affect job status
and pay of other employees, however, they have been excluded. 62
Despite the exclusions of managers and supervisors, there have
been a few cases in which the Board has found lawyers to be "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the Act. In Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Co.,63 the Board held that attorneys who work for an insur-
ance company but who lack discretion to make any settlements on
their own are covered by the Act. Later, in Fordham University64 and
Syracuse University,65 the Board deemed the faculties of two law
schools -to be bargaining units appropriate for coverage under the Act.
In the time since it decided Foley, Hoag, & Eliot, the Board has not
heard any cases involving lawyer unionization in private law firms,
but it has decided two cases involving attorneys working for legal ser-
vices corporations. In the first, Wayne County Neighborhood Legal
Services, 66 several attorneys who acted in a supervisory capacity vol-
untarily excluded themselves from the bargaining unit,67 and the em-
55. See note 41 supra for the definition of "supervisor."
56. See text following note 41.
57. See, e.g., Musselman's Apothecary, 188 N.L.R.B. 105 (1971).
58. See, e.g., Western Elec. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1960).
59. See, e.g., Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 641-46 (1972); Cornell Univ.,
183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970) (the Board's first assertion of jurisdiction over private, non-
profit universities).
60. The overlap between the terms "professional" and "supervisor," and the
Board's efforts to apply these terms, are discussed in Finkin, The Supervisory Status of
Professional Employees, 45 FORDHAi L. RFV. 805 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Doctor's Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951 (1970).
62. Id. at 951-52.
63. 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).,
64. 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1971).
65. 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973). The Board noted that a bargaining unit of
law professors and other professors, would also be appropriate. Id.
66. 1977-78 NT RB Dec. 30,262 (1977).
67. Id. at 30,263.
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ployer did not argue that the other lawyers served in a supervisory or
managerial capacity. 68 Similarly, in Camden Regional Legal Services0 0
the employer did not contend that the lawyers were not "employees"
within the meaning of the Act. 70 Thus no litigation to date focused on
the question of when, if ever, a lawyer working for a law firm or legal
aid office will be outside the Act's definition of "employee" because of
managerial or supervisory authority.
To benefit from Foley, lawyers must not only be "employees" as
defined by the Act, but must also work for an "employer" as defined
in section 2 (2), which exempts "the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation . . . or any State or political subdi-
vision thereof."71 Attorneys employed by a city, county, or state at-
torney's office or by a public defender's office are thus excluded from
the protection of the Act,72 while those employed by private law firms
are not.
Section 2 (2) 's effect on quasi-governmental employers is less cer-
tain. The recent Board decisions concerning legal services corporations
may provide some guidance. In Wayne County Neighborhood Legal
Services, the employer was a non-profit corporation funded by Legal
Services Corporation, a Congressionally-created organization. The Act
of Congress which established Legal Services Corporation provides
that it is not an agent or instrumentality of the federal government,
and that its employees are not employees of the government.7 3 Rely-
ing on this, the Board held that section 2 (2) did not exclude Wayne
County Legal Services from the Act. This decision was closely followed
in Camden Regional Legal Services, in which the employer was also
a non-profit corporation funded by Legal Services Corporation. Here,
though, state and local governments also helped to fund the corpora-
68. Id. The employer did contend, however, that employees classified as Attorney
I (recent law school graduates not yet admitted to the Bar) lacked a community
of interest with other employees and should therefore be excluded. The board dis-
agreed. Id. at 30,263-64.
69. 1977-78 NLRB Dec. 30,615 (1977).
70. Although the employer did not dispute the "employee" status of the attorneys,
the NLRB could not have exercised jurisdiction without first determining that the
petitioners were "employees."
71. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1974). Technically, § 152(3) defining "employee" ex-
cludes those who do not work for an "employer" as defined in § 152(2).
72. Public employees can, however, take advantage of state and federal statutes
authorizing them to form employee groups. See Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R, 191
(1969). See also Bornstein, Perspective on Change in Local Government Collective
Bargaining, 28 LAB. L.J. 431 (1977) (discussing recent trends in public employee
unionism).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996d(e) (1) (1977).
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tion. Nonetheless, the corporation was deemed a private employer not
excluded by section 2 (2). Thus, for purposes of section 2 (2), finan-
cial contributions from a political subdivision do not make the cor-
poration a "wholly owned government corporation."74
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A further impediment to lawyer unionization is the possibility
that such activity might be forbidden by the American Bar Associa-
tion's Code of Professional Responsibility. Although ABA standards
do not affect the Board's power to assert jurisdiction, they could none-
theless effectively deter lawyers from unionizing.
The ABA's first pronouncement concerning lawyer unionization
was a response to the successful attempt of several lawyers employed
by an insurance company to gain recognition as a bargaining unit.75
The Committee on Professional Ethics issued Formal Opinion 275,76
which said that lawyer unionization would violate six of the Canons of
Ethics. The committee cited as potential evils: conflict of interest be-
tween client and union,77 divulgence of confidential information,78
price-fixing,7 9 and, in the event of a strike, failure to maintain the
74. Similarly, in an advisory opinion, Legal Servs. for Northwestern Pa., 1977-78
NLRB Dec. 30,438 (1977), the Board stated that if the jurisdictional minimum were
met, it would assert jurisdiction over the employer, even though it was a noncom-
mercial, nonprofit enterprise receiving 25% of its funding from the state of Pennsylvania,
and the other 75% from the federal government. Id. at 30,439 n.2.
75. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948).
76. ABA CoiMu. ON PROFESSIONAL ETrncs, OPINIONS, No. 275 (1947).
77. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No, 6 provides in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
78. Id. No. 37 provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty
outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and
neither of them should accept employment which involves or may involve
the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advantage
of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his
knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources
of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment when he dis-
covers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his
former or to his new client.
79. Id. No. 12 provides in part:
In determining the customary charges of the Bar for similar services, it is
proper for a lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a
Bar Association, but no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby
or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
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dignity of the profession, ° and unjustified withdrawal from a case.81
For almost 20 years, Formal Opinion 275's condemnation of
lawyer unionization stood as the ABA's official position. During that
time an increasing number of governmental units recognized -the right
of public employees to organize and bargain collectively.8 2 These pub-
lic employee organizations included a higher proportion of white col-
lar and professional workers than had been organized in the private
sector.83 Since the employees' elected representatives were exclusive
bargaining agents, lawyers were deprived of any means of negotiating
salary, hours, and conditions of employment. Thus, publicly employed
lawyers were the first to put pressure upon the ethics committee to
modify its earlier condemnation of unionization. However, in Opin-
ion 917,84 the committee reaffirmed its earlier stand and noted that
Canon 35,85 which prohibited the exploitation of the services of a
lawyer by any lay agency, would be in jeopardy as long as lawyers
belonged to unions with non-lawyers.
Although a temporary obstacle to lawyer unionization, Opinion
917 provided a basis for limiting Opinion 275. If lawyers could not
join unions because of exploitation by non-lawyers, could they form
unions having only lawyers? Yes, said the committee in Opinion 986,0
as long as the lawyers adhered to the other canons. In subsequent
opinions, the ethics committee enlarged the situations in which law-
yers could ethically unionize 7
80. Id. No. 29 provides in part "[the lawyer] should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession."
81. Id. No. 44 provides in part:
The right of an attorney or counsel to withdraw from employment, once
assumed, arises only from good cause. Even the desire or consent of the client
is not always sufficient. The lawyer should not throw up the unfinished task to
the detriment of his client except for reasons of honor or self-respect.
82. Between 1956 and 1968 public employee unionism expanded from 915,000
to 2,155,000. Gitlow, Public Employee Unionism in the United States: Growth &
Outlook, 21 LAB. L.J. 766 (1970).
83. Id. at 768.
84. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 917 (1966).
85. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 35, provides:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any lay agency, personal or corprate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. . . . He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
duties by or in the interest of such intermediary.
86. ABA CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 986 (1967).
87. ABA Comrm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1029 (1968). The
committee decided that it was immaterial whether the union's bylaws required ad-
herence to the Canons of Ethics as long as the lawyers acted in accordance with them.
Id. Later, the committee approved of law professors' joining a union with non-lawyers,
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The 1969 revision of the Canons of Ethics 88 continued the trend
towards formal ABA acceptance of attorney unionization. In the pref-
ace to the Code of Professional Responsibility, the authors note that
"[c]hanged and changing conditions in our legal system and urbanized
society require new statements of professional principles."8 9 Ethical
Consideration 5-13 of the Code states:
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by
any organization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or
suggest when or how he should fulfill his professional obligations to
a person or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although it
is not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation
or similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he
should be vigilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his em-
ployer, free from outside influences. 90
Since the adoption of the new Code, the Committee on Professional
Ethics has issued Informal Opinion 1325, 91 the most recent attempt to
deal with the issue of lawyer unionization. The opinion specifically
states that "[t]he Code of Professional Responsibility contains no Dis-
ciplinary Rule that specifically prohibits membership by lawyers in
unions or associations representing lawyers."9 2 The committee's opin-
ion distinguishes between membership in an employee organization
and participation in acts which would violate other disciplinary rules,
such as failing -to protect a client's confidences, or neglecting a legal
matter by lengthy participation in a strike. The issue today is not
whether lawyers may unionize, 3 but to what extent they may engage
in concerted activities to achieve better salaries and terms of employ-
ment.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB's decision in Foley, Hoag & Eliot to assert jurisdic-
tion over law firms comports with two other trends: increased mem-
bership in unions by white collar workers and professionals, and the
noting the absence of any attorney-client relationship that might be compromised. ABA
Cosm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1060 (1967).
88. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT. (1976).
89. Id.
90. Id. at EC 5-13.
91. ABA Cosise. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 1325 (1975).
92. Id.
93. See Note, The Unionization of Attorneys, 71 COLUmn. L. REv. 100, 111-17
(1971) (discussing the problems of lawyer unionization under the Canons of Ethics).
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tendency of judicial bodies to dispense with special treatment of the
legal profession. 94 Foley has raised the possibility that privately-em-
ployed attorneys may unionize under the Act. Furthermore, the ABA's
decision to sanction lawyer unionization has removed another, per-
haps greater, impediment to the formation of lawyers' unions. Al-
though some concerted activities, such as strikes, would still violate
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the bulk of union activity,
especially collective bargaining, may now be carried on without fear
of reprimand.
The extent to which Foley will ultimately affect the legal pro-
fession, however, depends on whether attorneys are held to be "em-
ployees" within the meaning of the Act. Their inclusion hinges on
whether the NLRB finds that privately-employed lawyers are "profes-
sional," and thus included, or "managerial," and therefore excluded.
Because the definitions overlap, the distinction between the two cate-
gories is difficult to pinpoint. The only distinction to be gleaned from
the decisions is a formalistic one between having discretion in the
performance of one's job and having discretion "independent" of the
policies of one's employer. Clearly, the rights of lawyers to form
unions should not depend on such an evanescent distinction. Rather,
the Act's protections should be denied only when the attorney's loyalty
to the employer would interfere with effective participation in union
activities. Recent representation cases in which lawyers were found to
be appropriately included within a bargaining unit indicate that the
Board does consider lawyers to be "employees" within the meaning
of the Act, at least in some cases. These decisions, coupled with the
ABA's approval of lawyer membership in unions, signal a green light
for future lawyer unionization.
DEBRA A. NORTON
94. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyers have a
first amendment right to advertise despite bar association rules to the contrary); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (establishment of a minimum fee
schedule for legal services violates antitrust law).
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